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Abstract
This study explores the linkage between the labor force participation of the elderly
and the long-run performance of the economy in the context of a two-period-lived over-
lapping generations model. We assume that the old agents are heterogeneous in their
labor e¢ciency and they continue working if their income exceeds the pension that can
be received in the case of full retirement. We rst inspect the key factors that deter-
mine the labor supply of old agents. We then examine analytically as well as numeri-
cally the long-run impact of labor participation of the elderly on capital accumulation.
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1 Introduction
In many developed countries, the labor force participation of the elderly substantially declined
during the mid-1960s and the late 1980s. It was pointed out that the enhancement of social
security programs in those countries promoted earlier retirement, which was the main source
of the decrease in the labor force participation of the elderly. However, since the early 1990s,
the rates of the labor force participation of the elderly in several industrialized countries have
been increasing. For example, according to the Aging Society White Paper 2017 issued by
the Japanese Cabinet O¢ce, the labor forces share of the Japanese elderly aged 65 years
and over increased from 5.9% in 1980 to 11.8% in 2016. Currently, more than 50% of the
Japanese elderly aged 6569 years engage in full-time- or part-time jobs. Such a trend stems
from rises in longevity and health status of the elderly as well as from changes in the social
environment that increase the activeness of the elderly. Additionally, researchers claim that
a change in the elderlys labor supply is closely related to pension reforms. As mentioned
below, several empirical studies, which use data of various countries, conrm that the recent
rise in the labor force participation of the elderly had a statistically signicant link to pension
reforms implemented in those sampled industrialized countries after the 1990s.
In this study, we examine a model that may capture the basic facts mentioned above.
First, we elucidate the key factors that determine the labor force participation of the elderly.
Subsequently, we explore the long-run impacts of a rise in the labor force participation of
the elderly on the aggregate economy. For this purpose, we construct a two-period-lived
overlapping generations model in which the labor force participation of the old agents is
endogenously determined. Based on this analytical framework, we investigate how changes in
various factors that determine the labor force participation of the elderly a¤ect the behaviors
of key macroeconomic variables in the long run.
Specically, in our model economy, the young agents are assumed to be homogeneous and
they fully devote their available time to working. However, the old agents are heterogeneous
in the sense that their labor e¢ciency di¤ers from each other. We assume that the old agents
draw their labor e¢ciency from a given distribution function at the beginning of their old
age. We also assume that there is a compulsory pay-as-you-go pension plan nanced by
taxation on the young generations income. Given this setting, each old agent compares the
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expected pension revenue in the case of full retirement with the income that can be earned
from the labor force participation; this determines the agents decision to either fully retire or
participate in the labor force . Such a decision determines a cuto¤ level of labor e¢ciency
the agents who have a lower e¢ciency level than the cuto¤ select full retirement, and the
agents whose e¢ciency exceeds the cuto¤ continue working in their old age. We show that
the pension scheme set by the government as well as the rate of population aging directly
a¤ect the threshold level of labor e¢ciency, thereby determining the labor force participation
of the elderly.
The production side of the economy follows the standard neoclassical growth model.
Therefore, in the long-run equilibrium capital and income grow at an exogenously specied
population growth rate, and per capita levels of capital and income stay constant over time.
Given this setting, we analytically show that an increase in the labor force participation of
the old agents, generally, increases the steady state level of capital stock per population of the
young generation. In addition to the theoretical discussion, we examine numerical examples
to evaluate quantitative impacts of changes in the degree of population aging and the policy
parameters on the labor force participation of the elderly and the steady state level of capital.
Our numerical discussion reveals that magnitudes of those impacts are sensitive to the shape
of the distribution function of the labor e¢ciency of the old agents.
Related Litreture
(i) Empirics
A number of authors conduct empirical studies on the relationship between social security
and labor force participation of the elderly based on the data in various counties1. Concerning
the decline in the labor force participation of the elderly during the period 19601990, Gruber
and Wise (1999, 2004, and 2007) provide meticulous research outcomes. Among others,
Gruber and Wise (1999) present detailed empirical studies on 11 industrialized countries and
reveal that an increase in the generosity of the social security plan contributed towards the
international trend of the decline in the labor force participation of old persons2. In contrast,
the recent studies focus on the persistent rise in the labor force participation of the elderly
1A well-cited earlier empirical study on this topic is Krueger and Pischke (1992).
2Gruber and Wise (1998) summarize their main ndings.
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since the early 1990s. For example, Oshio et al. (2011) examine the impact of social security
reforms on the labor force participation of the Japanese elderly over a period of 40 years
(1968-2007). They nd that the labor force participation of the elderly started increasing
after the 1985 reform that reduced the generosity of social security benets, including pension
plans3. In a similar vein, Berkel et al. (2004) study the impact of pension reforms on the
retirement decision of the German elderly population, while Bottazzi et al. (2008) and Bovini
(2018) discuss the e¤ect of pension reforms on the elderlys retirement decision and wealth
accumulation in Italy. Additionally, Coil (2015) presents a useful survey on empirical studies
on this topic4.
Several authors point out that health condition is also important for the labor force partic-
ipation of the elderly. Kalwji and Vermeulen (2008) investigate the impact of health condition
on the labor force participation of the elderly in 11 European countries. They provide care-
ful estimation results and clarify the multidimensional nature of the health condition of the
elderly. Overall, their results reveal that health status is one of the major factors that a¤ects
the retirement decision of the elderly. Similar studies are conducted by Mete and Schlutz
(2002) on Taiwan and by Cai (2007) on Australia5.
(ii) Theory
Many authors modify Diamonds (1965) overlapping generations (OLG) model to intro-
duce endogenous labor supply of the old agents. The most popular idea in the eld is to
assume that young agents fully devote their available time to working, whereas old agents
make the labor-leisure choice. In this setting, an increase in the labor force participation of
the elderly means that old agents select a lower level of leisure time. A sample of this type
of formulation includes Zhang and Zhang (2009), Gon and Liu (2012), Mizuno and Yakita
(2013), and Hirazawa and Yakita (2017). Since this modelling assumes that agents are homo-
geneous, all the old agents select the same level of partial retirement that corresponds to the
length of leisure time they choose. A deciency of this formulation is that it fails to capture
the fact that, in reality, a substantial number of the elderly fully retire.
On the other hand, a few authors have examined models in which the full retirement deci-
3Higuchi et al. (2006), Shimizutani (2013), and Shimizutani and Oshio (2013) present further evidence.
4See also Coil and Levine (2018).
5Gacía-Pèrez et al. (2013) present an empirical study on the relationship between retirement incentive,
pension, and employment status based on the Spanish data.
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sion of the elderly is endogenously determined. Among others, Matsuyama (2008) constructs
a two-period-lived OLG model in which old agents make a discrete choice between working
and retirement by comparing utilities obtained in alternative situations. In his model, agents
in each cohort are homogeneous; this ensures that the decision regarding the choice between
working and retirement is uniform among the elderly6. Aisa et al. (2015) introduce agent
heterogeneity. In their model, each agent is endowed with a given labor e¢ciency, at the
outset of the agents life, and agents whose labor e¢ciency exceeds an endogenously deter-
mined threshold level work in their old age. Although the basic idea of Aisa et al. (2015) is
similar to our model, the authors treat a two-period model, and hence the long-run e¤ect of
the old agents labor supply on capital accumulation is not updated in their study7. When
compared to the foregoing formulations mentioned above, our model, which emphasizes the
heterogeneity of old agents, has an advantage it can simultaneously determine full retire-
ment of some old agents as well as the aggregate level of labor force participation of the
elderly in a dynamic environment.
Concerning the link between the social security and labor force participation of the elderly,
Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) present an early theoretical study. These authors explore opti-
mal social insurance in the presence of endogenous retirement and asymmetric information.
In macroeconomics research, Hu (1979) conducts one of the earliest studies on the impact
of social security on labor supply of the elderly in the context of Diamonds (1965) OLG
model. In his model, the old agents make the labor-leisure choice and they receive a pension
for their leisure time. Given this setting, Hu (1979) explores the long-run e¤ect of a pay-as-
you-go pension system on capital accumulation. Recently, Hus modelling was employed by
Miyazaki (2017), who examines the optimal social insurance in the presence of endogenous
retirement. Cipriani (2018) also uses a similar setting to study the macroeconomic impact of
population aging8. Since the analytical frameworks used by Hu (1979), Miyazaki (2017), and
Cipriani (2018) are essentially the same as the models of Zhang and Zhang (2009) and others
6Matsuyama (2008) shows that the model involves multiple steady states so that a poverty trap arises.
Gon and Liu (2012) indicate that if the model allows partial retirement, then it would imply that the steady
state equilibrium is uniquely determined. Since the model discussed by Gon and Liu (2012) is a variant of the
labor-leisure choice models mentioned above, it does not depict full retirement of some of the old agents.
7 It must be pointed out that Matsuyama (2008) briey examines a modied model in which disutility levels
of labor is heterogeneous among agents; this ensures that some old agents fully retire in equilibrium. However,
he does not consider this line of formulation in detail.
8See also Phillippe and Pestieau (2013).
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mentioned above, their discussions do not depict the full retirement decision of the elderly.
Again, it is worth emphasizing that our model with heterogenous elderly can highlight the
relationship between pension schemes and the full retirement of the elderly in a coherent
manner9.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 constructs the analytical framework
for our discussion. Section 3 inspects the existence and stability of the steady state equilib-
rium of the model economy. Section 4 characterizes the relationship between the steady state
equilibrium and the key parameters involved in the model. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Households
Consider an overlapping generation economy in which each agent lives for two periods, young
and old. We assume that young agents live for one period with certainty, but they face
a probability of surviving to the old age. We denote the probability of surviving as  2
(0; 1]: Each cohort consists of a continuum of agents, and the mass of cohort grows at a
constant rate of n: We denote the population of cohort born at the beginning of the period t
as Nt: Then, it holds that Nt+1 = (1 + n)Nt: Since the population share of the old generation
in period t is Nt=(Nt+1 + Nt) = = (1 +  + n) ; population aging means that a decline in
the population growth rate, n and/or a rise in the probability of surviving, :
When young agents are homogeneous and each agent inelastically supplies one unit of
labor. When old agents become heterogeneous in the sense that their labor e¢ciencies di¤ers
from each other. Such a di¤erence in labor e¢ciency stems from di¤erences in each agents
health status and the motivation for labor force participation, among others. We assume that
the labor e¢ciency, denoted by h; is in between  (> 0) and 1: Namely, there is a minimum
level of e¢ciency of old persons labor, ; and the most able old agents have the same level
of labor e¢ciency as that of young agents. We also assume that the cumulative distribution
9Here, we focus on theoretical studies based on the two-period lived OLG models. There are several
quantitative studies on the relationship between social security programs and labor supply in the context of
calibrated multi-period lived OLG models: see, for example Kitao (2014 and 2015).
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function of h is specied as a truncated Pareto distribution in such a way that
F (h) =
1 

h

  
1 

1

  ;  > 1; 0 <  < 1 h 2 [; 1] : (1)
The functional form F (h) is set for analytical convenience. Additionally, in our model,
the income of an old agent who works increases with the agents labor e¢ciency, h: Since
foregoing empirical studies reveal that an upper tail of income distribution of the elderly
follows a Pareto distribution, our specication may be an empirically plausible one10.
In our model, if the agents born in period t survive in period t+ 1, then they draw their
labor e¢ciency, h; from F (h) at the beginning of period t + 1: It is assumed that h is
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) over time as well as across agents. In addition,
the probability distribution of h is assumed to be stationary. Therefore, the share of old
agents with a particular level of labor e¢ciency is constant and the same in each cohort.
The objective function of an agent born at the beginning of period t is a discounted sum
of expected utilities of consumption in both periods:
Ut = Et log [ct +  log xt+1] 0 <  < 1; h 2 [; 1] ;
where ct and xt+1 ,respectively, denote an agents consumption in the agents young and old
ages, and  is a given discount factor. When the agent in cohort t is young, the agents ow
budget constraint is
c+ st = wt   t;
where st is saving, wt is the real wage, and t represents an amount of income tax. In old
age, the agents budget constraint is given by
xt+1 = (1 + rt+1) st +mt+1;
where rt+1 is the real interest rate in period t + 1; and mt+1 denotes the agents expected
10Concerning the recent study on income distribution among the Japanese elderly, see Shirahase (2015) and
Seiyama (2016).
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income in old age11. Combining the budget constraints given above, we obtain the intertem-
poral budget constraint:
ct +
xt+1
1 + rt+1
= wt   t +
mt+1
1 + rt+1
: (2)
Maximizing Ut subject to (2) ; we nd that the optimal levels of consumption and saving are,
respectively, given by
ct =
1
1 + 

wt   t +
mt+1
1 + rt+1

; (3)
xt+1 =
 (1 + rt+1)
1 + 

wt   t +
mt+1
1 + rt+1

; (4)
st = wt   t   ct =

1 + 
(wt   t) 
mt+1
(1 + ) (1 + rt+1)
: (5)
The expected income in old age, mt+1; is determined in the following manner. As men-
tioned earlier, in the beginning of t+1; an agent born in period t draws own labor e¢ciency
from the given distribution of h:We assume that an old agent with ability h can o¤er h100%
a young workers labor service. Given the specication of the distribution of labor e¢ciency,
if an old agent born in period t retires, then the agent would receive a pension, pt+1: However,
if an old agent continues to work, then the agent would receive a part of the pension for the
fully retired old, (1  ) pt+1 (0 <  < 1), as a basic pension. Since we have assumed that
the old agent with labor e¢ciency h is h  100% that of an young worker, the competitive
wage o¤ered for an old agent with h is hwt+1: The old agents hope to obtain the maximum
amount of income in their old age, and hence the ex-post income in the old age is given by
max fpt+1; hwt+1 + (1  )pt+1g ; 0 <  < 1:
As a result, the cuto¤ level of labor e¢ciency of the old agents is
ht+1 = 
pt+1
wt+1
: (6)
11 In this paper, we assume that the wealth of unsurvived agents is consumed by the government. Alterna-
tively, we may assume that there is a competitive annuity market with free entry. In this case, the budget
constraint of an old agent becomes xt+1 =
(1+rt+1)

st + mt+1: Our analytical outcomes are essentially the
same under such an alternative setting.
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An old agent who draws h < ht fully retires, while an agent with h  h

t continues working
in old age12. Since the old agent retires with the probability F
 
ht+1

or continues working
with the probability 1 F
 
ht+1

; under the rational expectations hypotheism the income in
the old age expected in period t will be
mt+1 = F
 
ht+1

pt+1 +

1  F
 
ht+1

(1  ) pt+1 +
Z 1
ht+1
hwt+1dF (h) ; (7)
where
R 1
ht+1
hwt+1dF (h) is the expected wage income for an old agent who stays in the labor
force. In the above. the rst three terms in the right hand side expresses the expected pension
income, and the last term represents the expected wage income. 13.
2.2 Firms
The production side of our model is the standard one. The nal good and factor markets are
competitive. There is a representative rm that produces a homogeneous good according to
the following production technology:
Yt = AK

t L
1 
t ; 0 <  < 1; (8)
12We assume that if h = h; then the old agents would continue to select work.
13Alternatively, we may assume that each agent draws h in the beginning of his life. In this case, the optimal
consumption of young agents who draw h < h is
cRh;t =
1
1 + 

wt   t +
pt+1
1 + rt+1

for   h  h:
The optimal consumption of each young agent with h  h is
cWh;t =
1
1 + 

wt   t +
(1  ) pt+1 + hwt+1
1 + rt+1

for   h  1:
Hence, the average consumption of young agents is given by
Z h

cRh;tdF (h) +
Z
1
h
cWh;tdF (h)
=
1
1 + 
wt   t + F (h
) pt+1 + [1  F (h

t+1)] (1  ) pt+1 +
Z
1
h
t+1
hwt+1dF (h)
which is the same as derived above. Although the results are the same, we consider that our formulation
presents a more realistic situation than the model in which the destiny of each agent is determined at the
outset of her life. .
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where Yt is the output, Kt is the aggregate capital stock, and Lt is the input of labor service.
The rm employs both young- and old-workers labor service, Lyt ; and L
o
t ; respectively so
that
Lt = L
y
t + L
o
t : (9)
We assume that one unit of hours of work of a young agent yields one unit of labor service,
meaning that Lyt also denotes the total hours of work of the young agents. Similarly, it is
assumed that one unit of hours of work of an old agent whose labor e¢ciency is h gives h
amount of labor service. Thus, if we denote the hours of work of type h old agents by lh;t;
then the aggregate input of old workers labor service will be
Lot =
Z 1
ht
hlh;tdF (h): (10)
The prot of the rm is
t = AK

t
 
Lyt +
Z 1
ht
hlh;tdF (h)
!1 
  rtKt   wtL
y
t  
Z 1
ht
(wth)lh;tdF (h) :
The rm maximizes prot by selecting Kt; L
y
t and lh;t; and the rst-order conditions for an
optimum are given by
AK 1t L
1 
t   rt = 0; (11)
(1  )AKt L
 
t   wt = 0; (12)
h (1  )AKt L
 
t   hwt = 0 for h 2 [h

t ; 1] : (13)
Since conditions (12) and (13) are symmetric, the total demand of labor service is
Lt = [(1  )A]
1
 w
  1

t Kt: (14)
2.3 Government
We assume that there is a pay-as-you-go pension plan in which the tax for social security
is levied on the young agents wage income14. The tax revenue of the government is t =
14 In reality, income tax also applies to the old agents wage income. In our model, we ignore any government
spending, except for pension payments, we assume that old agents wage income is free from taxation.
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wt; where  2 (0; 1) is the at rate of the wage tax. For simplicity, we assume that the
governments tax revenue is spent on pensions alone and there is no government debt. Hence,
the governments budget constraint in period t is given by
wtNt = [F (h

t ) + (1  ) (1  F (h

t ))] ptNt 1: (15)
The left-hand side of (15) is the aggregate tax revenue, and the right-hand side expresses the
aggregate pension for the elderly. It must be noted that, by our assumption, the mass of the
old agents in period t is Nt 1:
2.4 Market Equilibrium Conditions
In period t; the young agents total labor supply is Nt; while the old agents total supply
labor service is given by
Nt 1
Z 1
ht
hdF (h) =
 
1 

1

  Z 1
ht

h

  
=
   1
(1   ) (   1)
h
(h)1    1
i
Nt 1:
Therefore, the aggregate labor supply denoted by N st is
N st = Nt

1 +
   1
(   1) (   1)
h
1  (h)1  
i 
1 + n

; (16)
and the labor market equilibrium condition is
N st = Lt: (17)
Since only young agents save, the market equilibrium condition of capital stock is
Kt+1 = Ntst: (18)
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3 Equilibrium Dynamics
3.1 Determinants of Labor Supply of the Elderly
To derive a complete dynamic system, we rst inspect the government budget constraint
(15) : Using (1) ; (15) ; and Nt+1 = (1 + n)Nt; we obtain ;
(1 + n) 
ht
=
1

  1 +
1 

ht

  
1 

1

  : (19)
This condition determines a stationary cuto¤ level of labor e¢ciency, h: As depicted by
Figure 1, the left-hand side (LHS) of (19) monotonically decreases with h; while the right-
hand side (RHS) of (19) monotonically increases with h: It is easy to see that there is a
unique and stationary cuto¤ that satises ht 2 (; 1) if the following conditions hold:
1

>
(1 + n) 

>
1

  1: (20)
Given (20) ; h is uniquely expressed as a function of parameters in such a way that
h = H(n; ; ; ;  ; ): (21)
[Figure 1]
Inspecting Figure 1, we see that a fall in n or a rise in  yields a downward shift of the graph
in the left-hand side (LHS) of (19), so that h decreases. Since the labor force participation
rate of the elderly is 1 h

1  ; population aging promotes the labor force participation of old
agents. Conversely, a rise in the rate of payroll tax,  , leads to an upward shift in the LHS
of (19) ; which gives a higher level of h: Thus, a more generous pension plan lowers the labor
force participation of the elderly. However, a fall in ; which means that a more generous
pension reform for the old agents who stay in the labor force yields an upward shift in the
RHS of (19) ; decreases h and increases the rate of labor force participation of the elderly.
This is because a more favorable pension plan for the old agents who do not retire makes
staying in the labor force more attractive.
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We also nd that the properties of the cumulative distribution function of h also a¤ect
the labor force participation rate of the elderly. First, consider the e¤ect of an increase in
the shape parameter,  : Letting the RHS of (19) be 1

  1 + F (h; ; ) : Then, it is shown
that @F (h; ;:)
@ 
> 0; so that the graph of RHS shifts upward. Thus, h decreases. It must be
noted that the magnitude of  represents the degree of heterogeneity of the labor e¢ciency
among the elderly. Hence, if old agents are more homogeneous, that is,  take a higher
value, then the labor force participation rate of the elderly will increase. However, we nd
that @F (h; ;:)
@
< 0; which means that a rise in the minimum e¢ciency of labor,  yields a
downward shift in the graph of RHS. As a result, a higher  yields a higher h and decreases
the labor force participation of the elderly.
In order to present an economic implication of this comparative statics result as to  and
, it is useful to remember that the expected value of labor e¢ciency of old agents is given
by Z 1

hdF (h) =
  
1   
Z 1
n
h  dh =
   1
 
1    1

(1   ) (   1)
:
We can conrm that a fall in  or a rise in  increases the expected value of h: Namely, if the
old agents become more heterogeneous or if the minimum level of labor e¢ciency increases,
then the average productivity of an entire old generation would expand. A low level of
 means that the distribution function of the density of h has a long and fat tail, which
gives rise to a high level of average productivity of the old agents. A higher  may imply that
the health status of the elderly is, generally, in good condition. Alternatively, it may reect
the social and institutional environments that encourage the elderly to participate in the
labor force. Since, from (6) the equilibrium value of the pension-wage ration is determined by
h =  pt+1
wt+1
; under a given ; a lower average productivity of the old agents gives rise to a lower
level of pension-wage ratio. In other words, a more homogeneous society realizes a relatively
high level of labor force participation of the elderly. By contrast, if a wide heterogeneity
among the elderly leads to a relative increase in their average productivity, then h will be
high. In this case, the labor force of the elderly is concentrated in the agents with a relatively
high level of e¢ciency, which can sustain a high level of pension-wage ratio.
In sum, the impacts of changes in the parameter values on the cuto¤ level of labor e¢ciency
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are as follows:
@h
@n
> 0;
@h
@
< 0;
@h
@
> 0;
@h
@
> 0;
@h
@ 
< 0;
@h
@
> 0:
Consequently, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If 1

> (1+n)

> 1

 1; then there is a unique level of cuto¤ in labor e¢ciency,
h 2 (; 1) : The rate of labor force participation of the elderly, 1 h

1  ;rises with a higher
longevity, ; a lower population growth rate, n; a lower payroll tax rate, ; a lower deduction
of pension for the old agents who continue working, ; a lower level of heterogeneity among
the elderly,  ; and a higher level of mimum labor e¢ciecy of the elderly, :
3.2 Existence and Stability of the Steady State
In view of (5) and (18) ; we see that the aggregate capital stock per population of young
agents, kt = Kt=Nt; follows
kt+1 =
1
1 + n


1 + 
(1  )wt  
1
(1 + ) (1 + rt+1)
mt+1

: (22)
Here, mt+1 is expressed as
mt+1 = F (h
) pt+1 + [1  F (h
)] (1  ) pt+1 +
Z 1
h
wt+1hdF (h)
= [1  + F (h)] pt+1 +
   1
(1   ) (   1)
h
(h)1    1
i
wt+1;
Equation (19) means that the threshold level of h stays constant over time and the pension
is proportional to the real wage rate :
pt =
1

hwt for all t  0: (23)
Furthermore, using (14) ; (16) and (17) ; we express the labor market equilibrium condition
in the following manner:
[(1  )A]
1
 w
  1

t Kt: = Nt

1 +
   1
(1   ) (   1)
h
(h)1    1
i 
1 + n

:
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This relationship gives the ratio between the real wage rate and the capital stock per
young generation, kt = Kt=Nt as follows:
kt =  [(1  )A]
  1
 w
1

t ; (24)
where
 = 1 +
   1
(   1) (   1)
h
1  (h)1  
i 
1 + n
: (25)
It must be noted that, like in Diamonds (1965) standard setting, if the elderly are homo-
geneous ( , i.e.,  = +1) and they do not work, then  = 1; so that (24) represents the
relationship between the real wage rate and an optimal capita-labor ratio selected by the
rms.
Finally, the relationship between rt and wt stems from (11) :
rt = A [(1  )A]
1

 1w
1  1

t : (26)
As a result, from (22), (23) ; (24) ; and (26) ; we derive a complete dynamic system of the
real wage as follows:
(1 + n)  [(1  )A] 
1
 w
1

t+1
=

1 + 
(1  )wt  

1

  1 + F (h)

hwt+1 +
   1
(1   ) (   1)
h
(h)1    1
i
wt+1:
(1 + )

1 +A [(1  )A]
1

 1w
1  1

t+1
 :
We rewrite the above system as
wt =   (wt+1) ; (27)
where
  (wt+1) =
(1 + n) (1 + )
(1  )
[(1  )A] 
1
w
1

t+1
+
1 + 
(1  )


1

  1 + F (h)

hwt+1 +
   1
(1   ) (   1)
h
(h)1    1
i
wt+1
(1 + )

1 +A [(1  )A]
1

 1w
1  1

t+1
 :
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It is easy to see that  2 (0; 1) means that   (0) = 0;   (+1) = +1; and that   (wt+1) is
monotonically increasing in wt+1: Additionally, as conrmed in the Appendix to this study,
we see that if  2 [0:5; 1); then   (wt+1) is strictly convex in wt+1; additionally, it holds that
limwt+1!0  
0 (wt+1) = 0
15: These results ensure that there is a unique and strictly positive
level of real wage, w; that satises w =   (w) : Since function   (:) is invertible, (27) is
expressed as
wt+1 =  
 1 (wt) ;
where   1 (wt) is monotonically increasing and a strictly concave function of wt that satises
limw t !1 
 1 (wt) = +1: Consequently, the dynamic system of the real wage has a unique
and globally stable steady state in which w =   (w) holds: see Figure 2.
[Figure 2]
As for the aggregate dynamics of our economy, we then nd:
Proposition 2 If 0:5 <  < 1; then the economy has a unique steady state equilibrium that
satises global stability.
4 Impacts of the Labor Supply of the Elderly
4.1 Steady-State Characterization
In the previous section, we focus on the single di¤erence equation of wt to inspect the existence
and stability of the steady state equilibrium. To investigate the long-run e¤ects of old agents
labor supply on the steady state values of key variables, it will be convenient to use the
following two conditions:
k =  [(1  )A] 
1
 w
1
 : (28)
15Since the nal good market is assumed to be competitive,  corresponds to the income share of the capital,
which ensures that it is, generally, set at around 1=3: One idea to set  > 0:5 is to follow Mankiw, Romer and
Weil (1995) and assume that Kt includes human capital that is perfectly substitutable with physical capital.
It must be noted that, as shown in the Appendix, the strict convexity of   (w+1) may hold even if 0 2 (0; 0:5):
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k =
1
1 + n
8<
: 1 +  (1  )w   w(1 + )1 +A [(1  )A] 1 1w1  1

1

  1 + F (h)

h
 
   1
(1   ) (   1)
h
(h)  1   1
i
: (29)
In the above, k and w, respectively, denote the steady state values of kt and wt: As mentioned
before, (28) represents the relationship between the capital stock per mass of each generation
and the real wage rate. A change in the labor force participation of the elderly changes the
level of : Equation (29) expresses the per capita saving of the young generation, which is
positively related the young agents after-tax income, (1  )w; and negatively related to the
per-capita consumption in their old age.
Figure 3 depicts the graphs of (28) and (29). We assume that the strict convexity condition
for   (wt+1) given in Proposition 2 is fullled, which establishes an inverse U-shaped relation
of (29) : In this case, the steady state levels of kt and wt are uniquely determined.
[Figure 3]
Once k and w are xed, the steady state values of the key variables are determined in the
following manner. The per capita level of income the steady state is
AKt L
1 
t
Nt + Nt 1
= A

1 + n
1 + n+ 

k1 : (30)
Additionally, the rate of return to capital and per capita pension are, Respectively, given by
r = A [(1  )A]
1

 1w1 
1
 ; (31)
p =
hw

: (32)
4.2 Comparative Statics in the Long-run
Using the steady state conditions derived above, we conduct some comparative statics in the
long-run equilibrium.
(i) Population Aging
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As mentioned earlier, in our setting, population aging means a fall in the population
expansion rate, n; and/or a rise in the survival rate, : Other things being equal, a decline
in the population growth rate, n; increases the discount rate 1= (1 + n) ; which increases 
dened by (25) : In addition, a lower n directly reduces h: As a result, both graphs of (28)
and (29) shift upward, and, hence, k increases (see Figure 5-a). On the other hand, the e¤ect
on the steady-state real wage is analytically ambiguous. This is because, while a decrease
in population of the young agents increases the equilibrium level of real wage, an increase in
the old agents labor supply depresses the competitive real wage. The resulting change in the
long-run rate of real wage hinges on the relative strength of those opposing e¤ects.
Similarly, we see that a rise in the probability of surviving, ; also increases k: The shifts
of graphs (28) and (29) are the same as Figure 4-a: a higher  means that the discount factor
of the households, ; increases, which promotes savings of the young agents. Additionally,
a rise in  increases the labor participation of the elderly, accelerating production and capital
accumulation. Again, the e¤ect of a rise in  on w is not claried without further restrictions
on parameter values involved in the model.
Concerning the impact of population aging on per capita real income, (30) yields
Yt
Nt + Nt 1
=

1 + n
1 + n+ 


1 + n
1 
k

1 +
   1
(1   ) (   1)
h
(h)1    1
i1 
:
(33)
Hence, a decline in n or a rise in  leads to three e¤ectsthe two indirect e¤ects that are rep-
resented by an increase in k and a decrease in h; these e¤ects positively impact the per capita
income in the steady state. The direct e¤ect expressed by terms

1+n
1+n+

and


1+n
1 
will be negative or positive when n decreases or  increases. Therefore, it still remains that
population aging on the steady state level of per capita income would be negative.
(ii) Pension Reform
We have conrmed that if the scal authority raises the rate of payroll tax, ; then h
will increase, leading to a decline in the labor force participation of the elderly. It is easy
to see that such an impact leads to downward shifts in both the graphs of (28) and (29) ;
leading to a decline in k. Additionally, (33) shows that a rise in  unambiguously lowers the
steady state level of per capita income. We obtain the same outcomes, if a reduction in the
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 by the government increases the share of the pension paid to the elderly in the labor force.
Conversely, if the government lowers  or raises ; then the steady state level of per capita
capital increases. Similarly, in the case of population aging, the impact of a pension reform
on the steady state level of real wage cannot be claried without imposing further restrictions
on the parameter values in the model. Consequently, a policy change favoring the retired
elderly, that is, a rise in the payroll tax levied on the young generation, does not necessarily
increase the steady state level of the per capita pension revenue, p: As sown by Proposition
1, while a higher  increases h; it may yield a negative e¤ect on w: Although a higher 
increases h; its total e¤ect on p would be negative if the steady state level of the real wage
is reduced by a rise in :
[Figure 4-a, b]
(iii) Income Distribution
In view of (32) ; the relative income between a fully retired old and a working old with
h > h is expressed as
(1  ) p+ hw
p
= 1 + 

h
h
  1

:
Hence, given h and ; all the factors that increase labor force participation of the elderly (a
reduction in h) enhance income discrepancy between the fully retired elderly and the working
elderly, except for a reduction in  that produces opposite e¤ects on the relative income.
For example, population aging reduces h; increasing the income discrepancy between the
retired and active old agents. Our ndings, in this section, are summarized by the following
proposition:
Proposition 3 (i) Population aging increases the steady state level of capital stock per young
agents, but its impact on the steady state level of income per total population is analyti-
cally ambiguous; (ii) a less generous pension reform, that is, a reduction in ; or a rise in
; increases steady state levels of capital and income per capita; (iii) population aging en-
hances income discrepancy between the retired and working elderly, while a more generous
pension reform (a rise in  or a reduction in ) narrows the income di¤erence between them.
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4.3 Numerical Analysis
In this subsection, we examine some numerical examples. First, we focus on the government
budget constraint, equation (19) ; which determines the cuto¤ level of labor e¢ciency, h
that, in turn, determines the labor force participation rate of the elderly, 1 h

1  : We assume
that one period spans across 40 years and  = 0:5; this ensures that the average time span
of the old agents is 20 years. We also assume that the baseline population growth rate is 2%
per year; this ensures that 1 + n = (1 + 0:02)40 = 2: 208: As a baseline case, we set:
 = 1:5;  = 0:1;  = 0:5;  = 0:3:
In this baseline setting, h = 0:467; and thus the equilibrium rate of labor force partici-
pation of the elderly is
L0t
Nt 1
=
1  h
1  0:1
= 0:354:
Before examining the e¤ects of changes in policy parameters and the degree of popula-
tion aging, we rst inspect the relationships between the shape of the distribution function,
F (h) ; and the cuto¤ level, h; and the rate of the labor force participation of the elderly,
Lot=Nt 1: The graphs in Figure 5 depict those relationships. As conrmed in the previous
analytical discussion, a decrease in heterogeneity among the elderly, that is, an increase in
the shape parameter,  ; lowers the cuto¤ level of e¢ciency. This ensures that the labor force
participation rate of the elderly increases. However, an increase in the minimum e¢ciency,
; increases h: Although these facts have been conrmed in the analytical discussion, the
graphs capture the nonlinear proles clearly. Particularly, Figure 5-b reveals that the old
agent becomes more homogenous (and hence  takes a higher value)the rate of labor force
participation of the old agent converges to about 0.4. Additionally, it must be pointed out
that, as shown by Figure 5-d, in our numerical example, a higher  increases the rate of labor
force participation of the elderly. If a rise in  is considered an enhancement of the health
status of the elderly, then the relationship between  and Lot=Nt 1, as depicted by Figure
5-d, would t well to the positive link between the heath condition and the labor supply of
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the elderly conrmed by the empirical studies mentioned in Section 1.
[Figure 5]
Figure 6-a to 6-d describe the impacts of changes in the degree of population aging, that
is, a change in n or ; on h and L0t =Nt 1: The graphs are depicted under alternative levels
of  and : The graphs demonstrate that a change in  exerts a relatively small e¤ect on the
graph proles. In contrast, a change in the minimum level of e¢ciency, ; has a substantial
e¤ect on the graph prole. Similarly, Figures 6-e, 6-f, 6-g, and 6-h depict the relationships
between policy parameters,  and  and h and Lot=Lt 1: Again, the gures show that a
change in  leads to a relatively large shift in the graph.
[Fifure 6]
Similarly, the panels in Figure 7 depicts the imacts of changes in policy parameters on
h and L0t =Nt 1; which conrm our analytical ndings mentioned before.
[Figure 7]
The graphs in Figure 8 show the relationship between the steady state level of capital per
population of the young generation and the key parameter values. A notable fact in these
graphs is that alternative levels of  lead to very small shifts in the graph, whereas di¤erent
levels of  lead to a relatively large shift in the graphs.
[Figure 8]
5 Conclusion
In general, the heterogeneity among the elderly is wider than that among the young people. In
particular, individual di¤erences in health status and motivation for labor force participation
are more prominent among the elderly than among the young. This study relies on this
simple fact to determine the aggregate labor force participation of the elderly. In our model,
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the heterogeneity among the elderly is represented by a distribution function of their labor
e¢ciency. We have shown that the aggregate level of labor force participation of the elderly is
determined by pension schemes, the level of population aging, and the prole of distribution of
labor e¢ciency among the elderly. We investigate how changes in pension scheme and the level
of population aging a¤ects the long-run performance of the aggregate economy. Our model
shows that population aging and a decline in the payroll tax levied on the young generation
promote labor force participation of the old generation, which increases the aggregate labor
supply. While a higher labor supply enhances production and investment, a higher income of
the elderly increases their consumption, which has a negative impact on capital accumulation.
The long-run e¤ect of a rise in labor supply of the elderly on economic growth hinges upon
the relative strengths of these opposing e¤ects generated by a change in the labor force
participation of the elderly. To investigate the net e¤ect of a change in the elderlys labor
supply on the long-term growth, we examined some numerical examples. Our numerical
experiment demonstrates that an increase in the elderlys labor force participation enhances
capital accumulation.
In order to obtain clear analytical outcomes, we have set some restrictive assumptions.
Particularly, we have assumed that payroll taxes levied on the young generation is propor-
tional to their wage income and that all the tax revenue of the government to expenditure
for pension. Due to these restrictions, the aggregate labor participation rate of the elderly
stays constant during the transition process of the economy. If we assume an alternative
pension scheme in which the per capital level of pension is xed, then it can be shown that
the threshold level of labor e¢ciency, ht ; does not stay constant over time, leading to more
complex aggregate dynamics than that treated in this study. Similarly, if we assume that
the tax revenue of the government is spent for other purposes, in addition to pension, then
the cuto¤ level, ht ; will change over time. Such an extension, again, requires us to treat a
more complex dynamic analysis. This means that we should heavily rely on numerical con-
siderations rather than analytical arguments. Finally, since we use the neoclassical growth
framework, the per capita income stays constant in the steady state equilibrium. It would
be interesting to introduce our setting into an endogenous growth model in which persisting
increase of the per capita income is allowed.
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Appendix
Let us express   (wt+1) as
  (wt+1) =
(1 + n) (1 + )
(1  )
[(1  )A] 
1
w
1

t+1
+
1 + 
(1  )


1

  1 + F (h)

hwt+1 +
   1
(1   ) (   1)
h
(h)1    1
i
wt+1
(1 + )

1 +A [(1  )A]
1

 1w
1  1

t+1

= B0w
1

t+1 +
B1wt+1
(1 + )

1 +B2w
1  1

t+1
 ;
where
B0 =
1 + 
(1  )
(1 + n) [(1  )A]
1
 > 0;
B1 =

1 + 
(1  )
 
1

  1 + F (h)

h +
   1
(1   ) (   1)

(h)1    1

> 0;
B2 = A [(1  )A]
1

 1 > 0:
Then, we nd the following :
 0 (wt+1) =
1

B0w
1

 1
t+1 +
B1
(1 + )

1 +B2w
1  1

t+1
 +  1

  1

B1B2w
1  1

t+1
1 +B2w
1  1

t+1
2 > 0;
 00 (wt+1) =
1


1

  1

B0w
1

 2
t+1 +

1

  1

B1B2w
  1

t+1
1 +B2w
1  1

t+1
2
 

1

  1
2 B1B2w  1t+1
1 +B2w
1  1

t+1
2 +  1   1
2 2B1B22w1  2t+1
1 +B2w
1  1

t+1
3
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=
1


1

  1

B0w
1

 2
t+1 +

1

  1

B1B2w
  1

t+1
1 +B2w
1  1

t+1
2
+

1

  1
2 B1B2w  1t+1
1 +B2w
1  1

t+1
2
2
4 2B2w1  1t+1
1 +B2w
1  1

t+1
  1
3
5
=
1


1

  1

B0w
1

 2
t+1 +

1

  1
2 B1B2w  1t+1
1 +B2w
1  1

t+1
2
2
4 1
1

  1
  1 +
2B2w
1  1

t+1
1 +B2w
1  1

t+1
3
5 :
It is easy to see that  2 (0; 1) means that   (0) = 0 and   (+1) = +1: Moreover, we nd
that 11

 1
  1 > 0 for  2 (0:5; 1) :
Therefore,  00 (wt+1) > 0 for all wt+1 > 0 if 0:5 <  < 1:
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